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I. PATENT AND ANTITRUST AS DIFFERENT, POSSIBLY CONFLICTING,
COMPETITION-POLICY ASPECTS

Patent law and antitrust law both implement competition policy.
Patent law encourages publicly disclosing inventions for rights to
exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented inventions.
Antitrust law regulates competition so that firms do not distort markets
for their own gain.
In some instances, patent law and antitrust law may conflict. For
instance, patent law lets a patent owner keep a continuation patent under
examination after the original parent patent has issued. Rambus exacted
royalties for continuations unknown to a standard organization which
had adopted a standard infringing upon Rambus' patents. The District of
Columbia Circuit rejected an antitrust monopolization claim against
Rambus. 1
This Article looks into possible illegal antitrust tying of a patent to
its continuation. To that end, it reviews basic patent structure and
interrelationships between a patent and its continuations. The Article
then reviews and rejects the standard real property analogy for patents
in favor of a new one modeling patent claims as gates to land. It then
reviews tying doctrine. Finally, it determines whether a patent and its
continuation should be deemed an illegal antitrust tying arrangement.
Applying the modem tying tests and guiding precepts, the gate model
suggests a patent and its continuation should not be deemed an illegal
tying arrangement.

1. Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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II. CONTINUATION PATENTS

A. Basic Patent Form
The common patent and patent application structure will have import
for the following discussion and analysis. Once the Patent Office
"allows" (i.e., approves) a patent application, the application's text and
figures become the issued patent. 2 Thus, patent applications and issued
patents have the same structure, so it suffices to describe a normal
application's structure.3
The patent laws demand a patent have certain parts. The statutes
demand the application have a specification and a drawing.4 More
expressly, the rules require a specification to include a claim or claims
and only require "drawings, when necessary." 5 Drawings are
"necessary" when needed "for the understanding of the subject matter
sought to be patented." 6 Almost all patents have drawings.
The Patent Office suggests how to structure a patent. First, the
application should have the invention's title.8 Second, when needed, it
should cross-reference related applications, state whether the research or
development was federally sponsored, and name parties to a joint
research agreement. 9 Third, when needed, it should reference the
sequence listing, table, or software listing appendix and incorporate-byreference the appendix.' 0
Almost all the other sections apply to all utility patents. The Patent
Office prefers the application have a few sections after the title: the
invention's background, brief invention summary, brief drawings
description, detailed invention description, claims, and an abstract." If a
sequence listing is on paper, it should follow the abstract.12
Almost all these sections count toward the "specification" describing
the invention. The specification must have a written invention
2.

See 35 U.S.C.

§ 151 (2012), replaced by Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of

2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, Dec. 18, 2012, 126 Stat. 1527; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE 1302.01 (2012) [hereinafter MPEP].

3. For a typical utility patent's structure, see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,208,045 (filed Nov.
16, 1998).
(2012), amended by Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of
4. 35 U.S.C. § l11(a)
2012, Pub. L.No. 112-211, Dec. 18, 2012, 126 Stat. 1527.
5. 37 C.F.R. § 1.5 1(b) (2013).
6. Id. § 1.81(a).
7. MPEP § 6.01.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id
12. Id.
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description enabling anyone skilled in the art to make and use the
invention. 13 It also must contain the best mode for carrying out the
invention. 14 Normally, the invention's background, federal sponsorship
statement, and list of joint research agreement parties are not deemed
part of the specification. The cross-reference to related applications can
incorporate-by-reference other applications' disclosures. For instance,
a continuation may incorporate-by-reference a parent application's
disclosure. 16
The invention's specification or disclosure includes the claims.'
Thus, the original claims partly define the application's subject matter
and scope. Applicants almost always change (i.e., "amend") the claims
during prosecution.' 8 But, the Patent Office rejects as "new matter"
amended claims outside the original filing's subject matter. 19 Thus,
these amendments change the application's patent protections, but they
do not change the application's information scope.
B. Continuation Types
A single patent application can create many related patent
applications.20 Suppose an inventor files an application unrelated to any
other patent application. The inventor can later file apFlications relating
back to the original application's filing date. ' The original
application/patent is the later applications' parent. The children are
continuation applications/patents.
1. Without New Matter-Relating Back to the Original Filing Date
The patent laws bar adding new subject matter (i.e., "new matter")
during prosecution. 22 This bar prevents applicants from asserting the
original application's filing date for subject matter absent from the
original application.23 Antitrust
scholarship about patents tends to
24
ignore the new matter bar.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
Id.
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.57, 1.78(a) (2013).
See id. § 1.78(a).
35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Seeid.§ Ill.
Id. § 121.

20. Id.; see generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 54-58 (3d ed. 2009); AMY
LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 2.05[C] (2008).

21.
22.
23.
24.

35 U.S.C. § 121.
Id. § 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f).
E.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation
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a. Continued Examination "File Wrapper Continuation,"
RCE Applications
A continued examination application, an "RCE," is a continuation
closely related to the parent. Often, the Patent Office rejects the parent's
original claims. 25 The applicant then amends the original claims, cancels
26
claims, or adds new claims. If the Patent Office again rejects one or
more claims, the applicant may "request continued examination" in an
RCE. 27 Thus, an RCE application at most differs from the original
parent, by different claims; otherwise, it remains the same. 8 The2 9RCE
application asserts the original filing date in any infringement suit.
An applicant can file an RCE application for all new claims.30 In
fact, as long as the parent or some continuation in an unbroken chain
leading back to the parent pends in the Patent Office, an applicant can
file a continuation with the same invention description but different
claims.31 But, the new claims cannot have new matter.32 In fact, patent
rivals'
law lets an applicant tailor continuation claims to better match
33
matter.
new
lacks
continuation
the
given
conduct,
infringing
b. Divisional Applications
Divisional applications result from the Patent Office restricting
examination in the original parent to a group of original claims. 34 Often,
the Patent Office's restriction requirement divides the original claims
into distinct invention classes. 35 For instance, a restriction requirement
may divide the original claims into two grou s: method claims and
claims for a product made by the method. Unless the applicant
"traverses" the restriction by successfully arguing all claims should be
examined in one application, the requirement forces the applicant to
"elect" (i.e., choose) a claim group for examination in the parent. 37 For
and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §7.1 le (4th ed. 2011).
25. See LANDERS, supra note 20, § 2.05; MUELLER, supra note 20, at 42-53.
26. See LANDERS, supra note 20, § 2.05; MUELLER, supra note 20, at 42-53.

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 132(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2013).
§ 132(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.
§ 120; 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.
§ 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.
§§ 120, 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.
§ 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

35
35
35
35
35
35

33.

HOVENKAMP, supra note 24,

34.
35.
36.
37.

35 U.S.C. § 121.
Id.
MPEP § 802.01 (2012).
Id § 818.03.

§

7.1le.
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instance, an applicant may choose to prosecute the method group in the
parent. But, the applicant keeps the right to file divisional children
applications for each claim group that is not chosen (e.g., the product
38
group). If the original filing had all claim groups, the parent and the
divisional applications have the original application's priority date. 39 As
with the RCE application, the divisional only differs from the parent by
its claims; otherwise, it remains the same.4 0
2. With New Matter-Continuations-In-Part (CIPs)
Unlike RCEs and divisional applications, some continuation
applications may contain new matter. This hybrid application is a
"continuation-in-part." 4 1 By filing a continuation-in-part (CIP), an
applicant retains the original filing date for subject matter disclosed in
the parent.42 But, the applicant gets the CIP's filing date for the subject
matter not in the parent. 43 CIPs may have an enlarged invention
description to support new matter claims.4 4 By filing a CIP, the
applicant concedes the CIP has subject matter not in the parent.4 5
C. PatentLaw's ContinuationLimits
1. During Prosecution-Barring New Matter and Double Patenting
A patent applicant cannot freely amend or add continuation claims
without limit.
a. New Matter
RCE and divisional claims with subject matter not in the original
parent application/patent will be rejected as new matter. 46 Like any
negotiation, an applicant will likely make the parent's original claims as
broad as might be patentable. Thus, RCE and divisional claims broader
than the original parent's broadest claims will normally have new
matter. Applicants can broaden claims by deleting elements or placing
fewer restrictions on each element. Besides broadening claims,
applicants may add new matter to claims by restricting or adding
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

35 U.S.C. §§ 120-21.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 120, 365; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2013); MPEP § 201.08.
35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 365; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b); MPEP § 201.08.
35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 365; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b); MPEP § 201.08.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 365; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b); MPEP § 201.08.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 365; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b); MPEP § 201.08.
35 U.S.C. § 132.
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elements in ways not described in the parent.
Though less important for the analysis here, continuation
applications may have new matter in their invention descriptions.4 7
Normally, when an applicant changes the written description, he/she
will file a CIP rather than an RCE or divisional.
b. Double Patenting
Further, any continuation claim with subject matter overlapping or
closely related to the applicant's claim in another application/patent will
be rejected as "double patenting." 48 Double patenting results from lack
of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.49 For a proper double patenting rejection, the applicant must
cancel the pending claim or disclaim i.e., give up) any right to assert it
with the prior claim against one party. o
2. During Litigation-Patent Misuse Affirmative Defense
Patent misuse doctrine shields a patent infringer from liability.5 '
Misuse doctrine bars a patentee from asserting a patent. It is an
52
equitable defense based on unclean hands. Patent misuse occurs when
the patentee tries to broaden the patent grant beyond the scope conferred
by the patent statutes. The broadening may be defined as seeking a
market beyond the patent grant.53 More precisely, patent misuse cannot
occur unless "the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anti-competitive effect." 54
Patent misuse examples include requiring licensors to use the patentee's
unpatented film in patented film projectors,5 5 and requiring the licensors
to buy the patentee's salt for a patented salt injecting machine.5
Historically, patent misuse closely related to antitrust infractions.
An antitrust infraction based on the patent necessarily implied patent
misuse because the misuse doctrine only required an "anti-competitive
47. MPEP § 1.53.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("may obtain a patent") (emphasis added); MPEP
49. MPEP § 804.
50. Id. § 804.02.

§ 804.

51. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, §§ 5.5b, 7.11; BRIAN G. BRUSVOLD ET AL.,
DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS §§ 29.02-06 (6th ed. 2008); CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE,
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10-11, 56-57, 60-61, 63 (2011).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Mediport, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (per curiam).

57.

HOVENKAMP, supra note 24,

§ 5.5b.
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effect."5 But, misuse has been possibly broader than antitrust for the
same reason.
The 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act60 curtailed the patent misuse
defense.61 In essence, it removed the defense where the patentee
asserted patent rights allowed by statute.6 2 The Act amended 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d) to expressly permit: enforcing patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement, refusing to license or use
any rights to the patent, or conditioning licensing patent rights on
selling or licensing other patent rights. 63
Also, the Federal Circuit's 2010 en banc decision in Princo
Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
distinguished patent misuse from antitrust infractions. 64 The ITC
respondent, Princo, asserted a patent misuse defense. 65 Sony and
Phillips separately developed and patented techniques for encoding
positions on compact discs (CDs). 6 They agreed to use the Phillips
analog method over Sony's digital method as part of the Orange Book
standard for making CDs.67 They then granted package licenses to the
analog method and a claim for the digital method, which possibly
blocked another technology in the Orange Book. 68 They also refused to
license any other claims from Sony's digital method patent for any other
purpose.
Princo argued that Phillips' conduct of forcing it to license patents
which were not required to make CDs was misuse. 70 In an earlier
appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that "tying
nonessential patents to essential ones" in Phillips' package licenses was
misuse.7 1 On remand to the ITC, Princo argued Phillips' package
license coerced Sony to adhere to the Orange Book and stifled
competition. 72 The ITC rejected this argument. 73
58. Id
59.
60.
(codified
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988)
at 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id. n.22 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
Princo Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331-34 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1323-24, 1330.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
HoVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 5.5b.
Id.
Princo,616 F.3d at 1323.
Id. (citing U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 1324.
Id.
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In the en banc decision, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected the
argument that a horizontal agreement between Phillips and Sony to
restrict access to Sony's patent was misuse. 74 It acknowledged the
licensing agreement between Phillips and Sony made Phillips' package
licenses more valuable by suppressing possible competition.7 5 But, the
Federal Circuit found no patent grant broadening agreement created
patent misuse.76
The court also conceded that the agreement between Phillips and
Sony might break the antitrust laws. 77 Horizontal agreements between
rivals surely raise concerns over the Sherman Act § 1.78 In any case, by
holding against misuse but conceding possible antitrust infractions, the
court strongly suggested patent misuse importantly differs from an
antitrust claim.
3. Patent Property Analogized with Real Property
a. Standard View-Claims as Land Boundaries
As a property type, patents may be compared or analogized with
land. In fact, some antitrust scholars have made the analogy as a starting
point for analyzing patents with antitrust precepts. For instance, a recent
article likens a patent to a deed. 79 The written description seemingly
matches a deed's general description in its granting clause.8 0
From there, the analogy becomes very loose. Patent claims
seemingly "set out the boundaries for determining what constitutes
infringement"81 like "compass courses and distances." 82 The article
argued the written description does not give a boundary because an
applicant could write a claim to "whatever is enabled and described by
the specification [including the written description], and that is not
made obvious by the prior art."8 3

74. Id at 1331-32.
75. Id. at 1332.
76. Id. at 1331-32.
77. Id.
78. E.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 5.1b.
79. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 935.
80. Id at 935-36.
81. Id. at 935.
82. Id at 936.
83. Id. at 938 (citing Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523,
538 (2010)).
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b. The Standard View Fails in Practice
But, in practice, the Patent Office would at once reject any claim to
"whatever is enabled and described." The Patent Office rejects
"omnibus," amorphous claims. 84 The Patent Office gives the sample
omnibus claim: "A device substantially as shown and described." 8 It
would reject the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) as indefinite for
"fail[ing] to point out what is included or excluded by the claim
language." 86 Other omnibus-claim examples include: "[t]he apparatus as
shown and described in figures 1-6," and "[a]ny and all features of
novelty described, referred to, exemplified, or shown."87
Utility patent claims must have elements. In skeleton form, an
apparatus claim has the outline:
A widget comprising:
Element A;
Element B; and
Element C, connecting the element A to the element B.
For.instance, consider a simple utility patent claim based on an example
in a standard claim drafting text:
An apparatus for shaking articles, which comprises
a containerfor the articles;
a base;
a plurality of parallel legs, each leg pivotally connected at
one end to the container, and connected at the other end to the
base, to support the container for an oscillating movement with
respect to the base; and
an oscillator oscillating the container on the legs to shake the

articles. 89
The elements, in italics, are: a container; a base; a plurality of parallel
legs; and an oscillator.
All the elements work together. All the unitalicized words after
"comprising" are "functional language" describing how the elements
interact. Each parallel leg is pivotally connected to the container and
84. See MPEP § 2173.05(r) (2012).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Exparte Fressola, No. 93-0828, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608 (B.P.A.l. May
11, 1993)).
87.

ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING

5, June 2011).
88.

See MUELLER, supra note 20, at 78.

89.

See FABER, supra note 87,

§ 3:1.1.

§

1:2 (Release
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connected to the base. In turn, the oscillator oscillates the container. No
element is unconnected to some other claim element.
Contrast this simple utility patent claim with the omnibus claims.
First, no omnibus claim expressly names even one element. Thus, no
omnibus claim describes cooperating or interacting elements to form a
working apparatus. The omnibus-claim drafter tries to capture every
possible property bit in one short sentence. Second, a realistic utility
patent claim, like the sample claim, must have a narrower scope than
the omnibus claims. The sample claim is much more concrete. If it were
an originally filed claim, it would be only a small part of a much larger
specification or invention description. If it were an amended claim or
one added after the original filing, the new matter bar would prevent it
from having a scope unsupported by the specification or invention
description.
But, a patent simply grants a right to exclude. 9 1 This matches a
traditional property concept. 92 Modern property concepts see exclusion
as only one stick in a property rights "bundle." 93 Either way, a granted
patent claim defines the owner's right to exclude others from the
property described in the claim. 94 Infringing a patent claim trespasses
the property described in the claim. Yet, any patent claim must be
enabled by the application's original description. 9 5 Further, the bar
against new matter prevents amended claims or added claims from
having a scope larger than the original description. 96
c. A New View-Claims as Gates to the Patent Description's Land
These factors suggest a more apt land analogy. A patent
application's original description, including the claims but excluding the
background section, defines the property's fuzzy outer limits. The
allowed claims define possible trespass areas within the outer limits.
Counter to a common patent-claims description as defining a patent's
boundary, 97 the numbered claims more resemble discrete open gates
into the property. Amended claims and added claims only change the
gates' positions; they do not change the fuzzy outer limits in the original
description.98 In essence, each allowed claim creates an open gate for
90. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f (2013).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
92. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1-15, 19n.3 (2007).

93.

See id. at 16.

94. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
95. See id§ 112.
96. Id. H§ 120, 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2013).
97.
98.

E.g., FABER, supra note 87,
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f.

§ 1:2.
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an infringer'spossible trespass.
And, patent infringement likens to land trespass. Modem trespass
normally needs a defendant's intent. But, it is merely the intent to
perform an act which contacts the property. 99 "Intent" does not require
wrongfulness. 00 Like trespass, patent infringement only needs intent to
perform the acts to infringe on all of a claim's elements; it does not
require knowing the claim exists.' 0 ' "Wrongfulness" from knowing the
land/property belongs to someone else results in "willful"
infringement.102 "Willfulness" lets a patentee get enhanced damages of
treble the reasonable royalty rate. 103 Patentees can show willfulness by
showing infringement after the defendant receives express notice
through a "cease and desist" letter.104
But, the land analogy will likely never be perfect. Normally, land is
a two-dimensional concept except for the ad coelum doctrine of owning
earth beneath and airspace above the land's surface.'
Rather, a
multidimensional model likely better describes the property described in
a patent's written property description. In any case, the gate analogy
likely holds for a multidimensional patent property description. Perhaps,
"portal" better labels a multidimensional gate.
4. Continuations in the Claims-as-Gates Land Analogy
a. Continuations Without New Matter-Replacing Differing Deeds in
the Standard View with Differing Gates to the Same Land
Though like the standard view of claims defining property
boundaries, the gate model subtly changes the land analogy. As in the
boundary model, a claim describes something about the patent's
property in the gate model. But, the boundary model assumes a claim
likens to a deed's granting clause. So, two patents in the same family
with different claims liken to two deeds with different granting clauses.
It becomes hard to know whether the two deeds belong to the same
property. Thus, that approach makes it easy to think the property in the
two patents can have little or no relation to each other.
But, the gate model makes clearer the relationship between the two
patents in the same family. Rather than certainly creating a different,
99.
ed. 1984).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

See id.
Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
See, e.g., LANDERS, supra note 20, at 461.
E.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 92, at 9-15.

§ 13 (5th
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new "deed," a second patent creates new gates. If a continuation has no
new matter compared with the parent, it has the same patent property as
the parent. Yet, the continuation will have different gates to the same
property.
(1) Divisional Applications/Patents-Claims in Different Classes
By definition, to have a divisional application, the Patent Office
restricted the original application's prosecution to claims in one
invention class.' 06 The divisional has original claims from the parent in
a different invention class.' 0 7 The written invention description is the
same original filing for both the parent and the divisional.1os The two
patent applications only differ by the claims. 109
(2) Parent and Continuation Claims in the Same Class
A continuation may have claims in the parent's claims' same
invention class. As the original filing remains the same, both patents
describe the same property with the same fuzzy outer limits. Even if the
parent lacked all the continuation's claims, they would not define new
property but only distinct gates. The new matter bar keeps new property
out of the continuation.I10
An RCE's claims may be different from the parent."' In practice,
applicants normally request continued examination because the Patent
Office rejected the original and amended claims. Applicants normally
narrow claims by amendments which are based on the patent
examiner's rejections and cited references. Thus, the amended claims in
the continued examination application are in essence pushed back from
the fuzzy outer limits defined by the original filing.
(3) The Tailored Continuation-Claims in Either the Same or Different
Classes Tailored to Match a Rival's Acts
As noted, patent law lets a patentee tailor a continuation's claims to
match a rival's acts.1 12 This describes patent-prosecution and
infringement strategy rather than patent-prosecution procedure; the
tailored continuation is like any continuation. The patentee adds or
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

35 U.S.C. §§ 120-21.
See id.§ 121.
Id.
See id
Id. §§ 121, 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f (2013).

111.

35 U.S.C. § 132; 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.

112.

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24,

§ 7.1l e.
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amends the tailored continuation's claims as in any other continuation.
The tailored continuation only differs from other continuations by the
patentee's intent; the patentee sees the rival's acts and then drafts or
amends the continuation's claims to best capture the rival's acts.1 ' 3 In
essence, the patentee who discovered the general invention ideas in the
parent takes the rival's specific ideas and includes the specific ideas in
the tailored continuation's claims, provided the claims do not add new
matter. As the tailored continuation avoids new matter, the tailored
claims relate back to the parent's original filing date.114
As the tailored continuation differs from other continuations only by
strategy and intent, the gate claim model applies to tailored
continuations just the same as to other continuations. A tailored
continuation may have claims in more than one invention class subject
to the new matter bar.
(4) Double Patenting Rejections
In general, double patenting rejects claims that have the same
elements as earlier allowed claims or are obvious with respect to
them.1 15 If any continuation claim has the same elements as a parent
claim, the Patent Office will reject it under novelty double patenting;
both claims have the same subject matter.11 6 Likewise, if any
continuation claim is obvious in light of a parent claim alone or
combined with an outside reference, the Patent Office will reject it
under obviousness double patenting; though not the same, the
continuation claim's sub'ect matter is obvious with respect to the parent
claim's subject matter. Double patenting rejections force an applicant
to cancel claims or to disclaim any right to assert them with the matched
parent claim." 8
In the gate model, double patenting rejects claims to overlapping
gates or gates not very far from each other and bars the applicant from
having one trespasser (that is an infringer) enter both gates. For real
property, overlapping gates in effect form one gate. If only part of each
gate overlaps the other gate, together they make one wider gate. If they
completely overlap, together they make one gate as wide as the widest
gate; if they have the same width, they form one gate of that width.
For claims in the same family, completely overlapping gates
represent one claim having all the other claim's elements. First, the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id.
35 U.S.C. §§ 121.
MPEP § 804.02 (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102; MPEP § 804.
See 35 U.S.C. § 103; MPEP § 804.
See MPEP § 804.02.

A PATENTAND ITS CONTINUATION AS AN ANTITRUST TYING ARRANGEMENT

2013]1

51

gates may be the same for a parent claim and a continuation claim. Both
claims will have all the same elements, and novelty double patenting
will reject the continuation claim as anticipated by the parent claim.
Second, the continuation gate may be wider than the parent gate. Thus,
the continuation claim will contain all the parent claim's elements. The
continuation claim would give an infringer a greater chance for
infringement. Thus, double patenting could reject the continuation claim
as anticipated by the parent claim for having the same elements.
Otherwise, double patenting could reject the continuation claim as
obvious in light of the parent claim. Third, the continuation claim's gate
could be narrower than the parent claim's gate. Then, all the
continuation claim's elements would be contained in the parent claim.
Thus, double patenting would reject the continuation claim as
anticipated by the parent claim.
Rather than fully overlapping, a parent claim's gate may only partly
overlap a continuation claim's gate. If the overlap contains one or more
elements in both claims, then double patenting may reject a continuation
claim under novelty or obviousness. 19 If the overlap has all of one's
claim elements, then the novelty rejection applies.1 20 If the overlap has
no elements, then double patenting should reject the continuation claim
as obvious in light of the parent claim.
Instead of overlapping, the parent and continuation claim gates may
have no overlap. If they are fairly close to each other, then double
patenting should reject the continuation claim as obvious in light of the
parent claim.121 Though the continuation claim will not have the same
literal elements as the parent claim, it will allow trespass (that is,
infringement) of nearby "land" described in the parent patent's written
invention description. As the continuation claim's gate moves further
away from the parent claim's gate, the continuation claim will become
less obvious.
b. Continuations with New Matter: Continuation-In-Part (CIP)
Applications/Patents
A continuation-in-part (CIP) application adds new subject matter to
the parent.122 Thus, a CIP is the only continuation to enlarge the patent's
fuzzy outer limits. In practice, inventors file CIP applications to add to
the invention description based on research or development after the
original filing. This added description supports new claims in the CIP to

119.
120.
121.
122.

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103; MPEP § 804.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102; MPEP § 804.
See35U.S.C.§ 103; MPEP§804.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2013); MPEP § 201.08.
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subject matter not in the original filing.' 23 In the gate model, only if a
continuation has new matter will there be any question as to whether its
property differs from the parent's property.
III. TYING DOCTRINE

A. Illegal Tying Generally
"A tie-in, or tying arrangement, is a sale or lease of one product or
service on the condition that the buyer take a second product or service
as well."l 24 It may be illegal under the Sherman Act § 1 or the Clayton
Act § 3.125 By the Sherman Act § 1, "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with the foreign nations, is ...
illegal."l26 But, the Clayton Act § 3 states it is unlawful
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether
patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser . . . shall not use or

deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities . . . to substantially lessen competition or tend

to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.127
The Supreme Court distinguishes between the Sherman and Clayton
Act tests. 1The Clayton Act § 3 only applies to commodities, not
business services.129 Under Sherman Act § 1, the Court holds tying
arrangements per se illegal when the firm has market power in the tying
product and the arrangement affects a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce in the tied product market.130 But, by Clayton Act § 3, the
Court applies a rule of reason to tying arrangements if either the seller
has a "not insubstantial" market power in the tying product market or
the tying arrangement affects a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce.
Thus, the Sherman Act needs both factors for illegality
§ 112; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b); MPEP § 201.08.

123.

See 35 U.S.C.

124.

HOVENKAMP, supranote 24,

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1(2012).
Id. § 14.
Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953);

HOVENKAMP, supra note 24,

129.
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See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 10.3.
Times-Picayune,345 U.S. at 608-09; HoVENKAMP, supra note 24,
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while the Clayton Act needs only one.132 Also, the Sherman Act applies
the stringent per se standard, but the Clayton Act applies the more
flexible rule of reason standard.133
Despite these differences, many lower courts apply one test for both
Sherman and Clayton Act tying cases.13 4 But, the illegal tying test
Lower courts mostly rely on the Ninth
differs among the circuits.
Circuit's test. 36 The Ninth Circuit's case was a class action involving
tying cookers, fryers, packaging products, and mixes to the Chicken
Delight trademark in a restaurant franchise arrangement.' 3 7 The Ninth
Circuit deemed that illegal tying has three elements.' 3 8 First, the scheme
involves two distinct items and requires that one item, the tying item
may not be obtained unless the buyer also gets the other, tied item.13
Second, the tying item has enough economic power to appreciably
restrain competition in the tied item market.140 Third, the arrangement
affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce. 14 1 To these core three
elements, some circuits also require anti-competitive effects in the tied
item market.142 Other circuits require some coercion to buy the tied
item. 143

Though the Supreme Court has not stated a tying test, it has given
some guiding thoughts.144 The Court has trended toward a rule of reason
for tying arrangements.1 4 5 But first, a scheme would need to meet three
conditions.146 First, the firm would need market power in the tying
132. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608-09; HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 10.3.
133. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 10.3.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 10.1 (citing Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. Am. Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th
Cir. 1981) (four factor test)); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980) (five
factor test).
136. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 195 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST] (citing Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971)); see also
LESLIE, supra note 51, at 154-65 (trademark tying case excerpts including Chicken Delight).
137. Chicken Delight,448 F.2d at 46.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. (citing Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14
(1953)).
140. Id. (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
141. Id. (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
142. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 136, at 195; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, §
10.1 (citing Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. Am. Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981) (anticompetitive effects as the fourth factor in the four-factor test)).
143. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 136, at 195, 210-12; HOVENKAMP, supra note
24, § 10.1 (citing Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980) (coercion as fifth
factor)).
144. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, § 10.
145. Id. § 10.1 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
146. Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 41.
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product.147 Second the scheme would present a "not insubstantial"
market power threat in the tied product.' 8 Third, a coherent economic
basis for treating the products as distinct would need to exist.1 49 Also,
the scheme would need to have an exclusionary or anticompetitive
effect in the tied product market.15 0
B. TraditionalPatent Tying, Antitrust, and Misuse-Assuming a Patent
Grants Market Power
Traditionally, a patent tying arrangement ties a commodity to a
patented device. 5 1 For instance, the International Salt Company leased
its patented machines.1 52 The first machine dissolved rock salt into brine
while the second machine injected salt tablets into canned products. 153
Though the company patented the machines, it had no patents on salt.' 54
Even so, it only leased its machines under the condition that the lessees
buy the rock salt and salt tablets for the machines from the International
Salt Company;' 5 5 the company tied unpatented salt to the patented
machines. The Court held this tying arrangement illegal by presuming
per se market power for the patented machine.156
Likewise, the Court refused to enforce patent licenses due to patent
misuse based on tying. 15 For instance, the Motion Picture Patents
Company sold patented movie projectors only if the buyer agreed to
rent movies from the patent owner.15 8 Likewise, the Morton Salt
Company required its patented salt injecting machines lessees to buy
unpatented salt.' 59 Though these arrangements very much likened to
International Salt's antitrust infraction, the Court refused to enforce the
patents in both instances as thing arrangements creating patent misuse,
but not an antitrust infraction.

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 40.
151.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
(1917).
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Id at 395-96.
See id at 397-98.
See id. at 398, 402.
See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 503, 517
Id. at 506.
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C. Modern Patent Tying-PatentsDo Not Automatically Grant
Market Power
Recently, the Supreme Court stopped presuming per se market
power based solely on a patent for a product/apparatus. 6 As with the
traditional patent tying cases, the case dealt with patented apparatuses,
an inkjet printer and ink container, and an unpatented commodity,
In scrapping the patent market power presumption, the Court
ink.
stressed the presumption started in patent misuse doctrine and migrated
to antitrust case law in International Salt Co. v. United States.163 It
noted Congress began a policy shift away from the presumption when it
codified patent law (in the 1950s) and stressed Congress's full shift
from it in the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act amending 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d).' 6 4 As the Court stressed, the Act barred the misuse defense
"unless .. . the patent owner has market power in the relevant market
for the patent or patented product." 65 The Court reasoned Congress's
express requirement for market power for findin patent misuse
removed the market power presumption for a patent. The Court also
relied on broad and weighty scholarship criticizing the patent market
power presumption. 16 7 Thus, the Court rejected the presumption based
on the revised patent statute and a broad policy consensus.
Perhaps the Court's shift in view sprang from the past few decades'
technology explosion. As the Patent Office examines hundreds of
thousands of patent applications each year, the position that one patent
would automatically grant market power now seems ridiculous. As with
the land analogy, loose usage of "monopoly" may have confused the
Justices in their traditional opinions.168 A patent confers a right to
exclude,169 not a "monopoly."

Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (per curiam).
See id.at 31.
Id. at 38-39 (citing Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
See id. at 41.
Id. at 41-42 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
Id at 42.
Id. at 43 n.4 (citing Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform, 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 57 n.340 (1991); 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST §
161.
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268 (2005); LESLIE, supra note 51, at 54 n.I (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289
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169. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013).

56

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. I18

IV. TYING A PATENT TO ITS CONTINUATION UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS
A. A Patentand Its Continuationin the Gate Model
Unlike traditional patent tying, tying patents in the same family does
not involve a commodity. Rather, claims in one patent are tied to claims
in another patent. If one patent is a divisional or RCE of the other
patent, the invention descriptions (except for the claims) will be the
same. If one patent is a CIP, the descriptions, apart from the claims,
may be the same. But, more likely, the CIP will have added more
description than the other patent.
Regardless of the precise differences between the two patents, they
need not be complementary like a patented machine and a commodity
used in the machine. Instead, they will likely cover different aspects of
one machine. For instance, an original patent application may have
apparatus, that is machine, and method claims. After a restriction
requirement, the applicant can prosecute the apparatus or method claims
group in the original parent application. Once the Patent Office allows
the parent to issue as a patent, or even before, the applicant can
prosecute the other claims group to allowance. Thus, the parent and the
divisional will together have apparatus and method claims based on the
same invention description. In essence, the patentee will have apparatus
and method claims to the same basic ideas. In practice, a machine
implementing the apparatus claims will also implement the method
claims. Thus, unlike traditional patent tying, tying the licensing of one
patent to another in the same family will likely cover the same machine
rather than a complementary commodity used in the machine.
The gate model for claims lends insight to this tying arrangement.
Each claim is a gate to the "land" described in a parent application.
Licensing a claim amounts to charging an admission fee to enter the
corresponding gate. Like an entrance to a vast stadium or coliseum,
each claim lets the licensee enter the patent's "land" for a certain time.
The licensor (that is, patentee) may set the admission price in terms of
money, fields of use, and physical location.
B. A PatentandIts ContinuationAre Not an Illegal Antitrust Tying
Arrangement as They Are Not Distinct
1. Applying the Tying Test
The parent patent has different gates from its continuation. The
Patent Office's examination of the continuation rejects claims having
new matter;170 these would be gates to land entirely unrelated to the
170.

Id. § 132; 37 C.F.R.

§ 1.121(f) (2013).
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parent patent's land. But, the Patent Office's examination also rejects
claims under double patenting as obvious or not novel. 17 ' Novelty
double patenting rejections ensure the continuation's gates do not fully
overlap the parent's gates. Obviousness double patenting rejections
ensure the continuation's gates lie significantly far away from the
parent's gates. Thus, the continuation's gates and claims differ from the
parent's gates and claims.
But, both the parent and its continuation have the same invention
description. The invention description is the "land" accessed by the
gates. Thus, though the gates differ, they open onto the same land, so
the patent and its continuation are not distinct. The parent patent and its
continuation must be licensed together because the parent and its
continuation have different gates (i.e., claims) to the same land.
2. Applying Jefferson ParishTying Precepts
Though a patent and its continuation have failed the tying test, they
may be distinct and capable of illegal antitrust tying under a more
abstract concept of "distinct." Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde posed the question as
being capable of a coherent theory for treating the parent and
continuation as distinct.172 Justice O'Connor stressed that "there must
be a coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as
distinct." 7 3 Further, "for products to be treated as distinct, the tied
product must, at a minimum, be one that some consumers might wish to
purchase separately without alsopurchasingthe tying product."l 74
Though a patent and its continuation can conceivably be licensed
separately, no licensee would ever want to license one without the
other; licensing only one patent would expose the licensee to an
infringement suit based on the other patent and a new round of licensing
and royalties.
The gate model makes the motivation for this behavior clear. The
parent and its continuation have the same property in their invention
descriptions. They only differ by the gates (claims) allowing trespass
into the property.
The tailored continuation is merely a special case. The most famous
case involved a standard body, the Joint Electron Devices Engineering
Council (JEDEC).17 5 Though JEDEC knew it had adopted a standard
171. MPEP § 804.02 (2012).
172. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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including Rambus patents, it did not know the patents had pending
continuations. 176 The District of Columbia Circuit rejected Sherman and
FTC Act antitrust monopolization claims against Rambus for tricking
the standard body into adopting its patents while the continuations were
pending.17 7 Regarding tying, in the gate model, Rambus merely licensed
only a few gates to an unsophisticated licensee. Echoing Justice
O'Connor's minimum distinctness test, JEDEC did not wish to license
separately the tied continuationpatents without also licensing the tying
parentpatent.17 8
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional view of patent claims as boundaries to patent
property fails to accurately describe them in practice. Viewing patent
claims as gates to property giving an infringer a chance to trespass on
the patent property better describes claims. The claims-as-gates analogy
simplifies analyzing the tying arrangement consisting of a patent and its
continuation. Applying standard antitrust tying tests and guiding
thoughts to licensing a patent and its continuation, modeling the claims
as gates to the same land in both patents' invention descriptions,
suggests tying a patent and its continuation is not illegal under antitrust
law. The patent and its continuation are not distinct items; they both
have the same property in their common invention description. Only the
gates to the property, the claims, differ.
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See id. at 460.
Id. at 467.
See Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

